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ABSTRACT
Social identities prescribe behaviors for people. We identify the marginal behavioral effect of these
norms on discount rates and risk aversion by measuring how laboratory subjects’ choices change when
an aspect of social identity is made salient. When we make ethnic identity salient to Asian-American
subjects, they make more patient choices. When we make racial identity salient to black subjects, non-immigrant
blacks (but not immigrant blacks) make more patient choices. Making gender identity salient has no
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Relative to white Americans, Asian-Americans accumulate more human capital and are 
more likely to participate in tax-deferred savings accounts. Black Americans accumulate less 
financial wealth, accumulate less human capital, and are less likely to invest in the stock market, 
even after controlling for observable demographic variables. However, recent black immigrants 
from the West Indies and Africa are disproportionately represented among high-income blacks 
and elite college students. Women invest in more conservative financial assets than men and 
behave more cautiously in laboratory experiments.
1 
Many social scientists have argued that differences in norms tied to social identities help 
explain such demographic differences in economic outcomes.
2 Asian-American identity is 
hypothesized to include a norm for patience, non-immigrant black identity is hypothesized to 
include norms for impatience and risk-averse investing, and a higher degree of risk aversion is 
hypothesized to be normative for female identity than for male identity. However, it is difficult 
to test with non-experimental data whether identity norms play a causal role in economic 
decision-making. Social category affiliations in the field are confounded with many other factors 
such as socioeconomic status, opportunity sets, and peer pressure (David Austen-Smith and 
Fryer 2005; Fryer and Paul Torelli 2005). 
In this paper, we use a methodology from social psychology to introduce exogenous 
variation in identity effects. According to “self-categorization theory,” a long-standing idea in 
                                                 
1 These findings are documented in Thomas Sowell (1975), Stanley Sue and Sumie Okazaki (1990), Derek A. Neal 
and William R. Johnson (1996), Erik Hurst, Ming-Ching Luoh, and Frank Stafford (1998), Nancy Ammon 
Jianakoplos and Alexandra Bernasek (1998), Annika E. Sundén and Brian J. Surette (1998), James P. Byrnes, David 
C. Miller, and William D. Schaefer (1999), Joseph G. Altonji, Ulrich Doraszelski, and Lewis Segal (2000), Glenn R. 
Springstead and Theresa M. Wilson (2000), Roland G. Fryer Jr. and Steven D. Levitt (2004), Rachel Croson and Uri 
Gneezy (2004), and Sara Rimer and Karen W. Arenson (2004). It should be noted that Christopher Carroll, Byung-
Kun Rhee, and Changyong Rhee (1994, 1999) do not find that Asian immigrants save more, but they are hindered 
by their data quality. Carroll, Rhee, and Rhee (1994) do find that Asian-Canadian immigrants’ educational 
expenditures are 3.6 times the Canadian average. 
2 See, for example, Thomas Sowell (1975, 1981, 2005), Barry R. Chiswick (1983), Charles Murray (1984), Geert 
Hofstede and Michael Harris Bond (1988), Richard P. Barke, Hank Jenkins-Smith, and Paul Slovic (1997), and 
Yankelovich Partners Inc. (1999).   3
psychology (William James 1890; John C. Turner 1985), environmental cues called “primes” can 
temporarily make a certain social category more salient, causing a person’s behavior to tilt more 
toward the norms associated with the salient category. If the self-categorization theory is valid, 
then a researcher can identify the marginal effect of a particular social category by 
experimentally varying the salience of the category and seeing how an individual’s behavior 
changes. 
Our focus is on the effect of ethnic, racial, and gender category norms on time and risk 
preferences. After randomly manipulating category salience, we elicit subjects’ time and risk 
preferences using incentive-compatible mechanisms standard in experimental economics. 
Section I describes a theoretical framework for understanding how priming effects allow us to 
make inferences about norms. 
Section II presents the first experiment, which studies the effect of Asian ethnic category 
norms on time and risk preferences. Consistent with the hypothesis that Asian category norms 
help explain high Asian-American capital accumulation, we find that primed Asian-American 
subjects make more patient choices than Asian-American control subjects. 
Section III presents the second experiment, which studies black racial category norms 
and gender category norms. Contrary to the arguments of Sowell (1975, 1981, 2005) and Charles 
Murray (1984), we find that making race salient causes native blacks—that is, those who have 
long-standing U.S. roots—to become more patient, whereas it has no effect on immigrant blacks’ 
discount rates.
3 We also find suggestive evidence that native blacks become more risk averse 
when primed with race, which is consistent with racial risk norms depressing native blacks’ 
                                                 
3 See Herbert J. Storing (1995), Cornel West (2000), and Bernard W. Bell (2005) for arguments that patience is a 
central feature of black American norms.   4
stock market participation, and that whites become more patient when primed with race. Finally, 
making gender salient has no effect on men and women’s risk aversion. 
There is a large psychology literature on identity salience.
4 Our work differs from this 
past research in two important ways. First, we focus on primitive preference parameters 
measured with incentive-compatible mechanisms, dependent variables that are primarily of 
interest to economists. Second, psychologists have emphasized testing the validity of self-
categorization theory and the cognitive mechanisms through which it operates. Therefore, they 
prime identities chosen specifically because their norms are known so that the theory has a clear 
prediction about the priming effect. We take self-categorization theory as given and prime 
identities with unknown norms so that we can infer what those norms are via the behavioral 
response to the prime. 
Section IV concludes. A web appendix contains the experimental materials we used.  
 
I. A Theoretical Framework 
Within our theoretical framework, which is inspired by Akerlof and Kranton (2000), 
priming a particular social category reveals the marginal effect of increasing the strength of 
affiliation with that category. Let x be some action choice, such as how much to pursue 
immediate gratification or how much to avoid risks. An individual belongs to a social category 
C, such as black race or female gender, with strength s ≥ 0. Let x0 denote the individual’s 
                                                 
4 Identity salience studies include Stephen Reicher and Mark Levine (1994), Mark R. Forehand, Rohit Deshpandé, 
and Americus Reed II (2002), and Robyn A. LeBoeuf, Eldar Shafir, and Julia Belyavsky (2006). In addition, 
priming techniques are widely used in psychology to explore broader cognitive processes. See, for example, John A. 
Bargh, Mark Chen, and Lara Burrows (1996) and Daniel M. Wegner and Bargh (1998). Our work is also related to 
economic research on social identity and discrimination against outgroup members (e.g., Karla Hoff and Priyanka 
Pandey 2006; Yan Chen and Sherry Xin Li 2009).   5
preferred action in the absence of identity considerations, and let xC denote the action prescribed 
for members of social category C. The individual chooses x to maximize 
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0 (1 ( ))( ) ( )( ) C Uw s x x w s x x =− − − − − , (1) 
where 0 ≤ w(s) ≤ 1 is the weight placed on social category C in the person’s decision. We assume 
that w(0) = 0 and w′ > 0. Deviating from the norm prescribed for one’s category causes disutility 
that is increasing in s, the strength of one’s affiliation with that category. We assume that s has a 
steady-state value s  (perhaps negatively correlated with |x0 – xC|) but can be temporarily 
perturbed away from s  by a category prime ε > 0. 
The first-order condition of (1) gives the optimal action, 
*
0 () ( 1 () ) () , C x sw s x w s x =− +  
which is a weighted average of the preferred action without identity considerations and the 
category norm. This condition yields several implications that guide our analysis.  
  First, the higher the steady-state strength s  of the category affiliation, the closer 
* x  is to 
xC. Second, a category prime ε  also causes 
* x  to move closer to xC. Thus, the behavioral effect 
of priming social category C reveals the marginal behavioral effect of increasing the steady-state 
strength s  of C. This is why priming manipulations are a useful experimental procedure for 
studying how identity affects steady-state preferences. Third, the sign of the priming treatment 
effect, 
** *
0 ()( ) ( / ) ( ) ( ) C x sx s d x d s w s x x ε εε ′ +− ≈ = − , depends on the sign of  0 C x x − . Even if 
the s ,  0 x , and w(·) of an experimental sample differ from those of the general population, the 
directional effects of priming the sample will generalize to the population as long as  0 C x x −  has 
the same sign for both groups.    6
The hypothesis that an identity norm increases patience corresponds to  0 C γ γ < , where 
γ is the degree of impatient behavior. Similarly, the hypotheses that an identity norm increases 
risk aversion corresponds to  0 C ρ ρ > , where ρ is the degree of risk-averse behavior. 
Some psychologists have expressed the intuition that priming a category should have a 
stronger effect on those who identify more strongly with that category. Our framework generates 
the perhaps surprising conclusion that this need not be the case. Let  0 C x x <  without loss of 
generality. Priming sensitivity increasing with identification strength corresponds to the 
condition 
2* 2 / dx d s > 0, which holds in a neighborhood of s if and only if  () 0 ws ′′ > . Depending 
on the shape of w(·) and the level of s, 
2* 2 / dx d s could take either sign. While it may be the case 
that individuals with higher s  are more susceptible to priming ( 0 w′′ > ), such individuals could 
instead become saturated with the category ( 0 w′′< ). Thus, measuring the interaction between 
priming and identification strength does not test the theory’s validity. 
 
II. Experiment 1: Asian-American Ethnic Norms 
A. Procedure 
Participants were Harvard College undergraduates, 71 of Asian descent and 66 of white 
descent. Half the participants were randomly assigned to the ethnicity-salience condition and half 
to the control condition. Subjects responded to a “background questionnaire” that varied by 
experimental condition, then a time preference elicitation, and finally a risk preference 
elicitation. 
In the ethnicity-salience condition, the “background questionnaire” included questions 
about languages spoken by the subject’s family and how many generations the subject’s family 
has lived in the United States. This manipulation was originally used by Margaret Shih, Todd L.   7
Pittinsky, and Nalini Ambady (1999) to make ethnicity salient to Asian-Americans. In the 
control condition, the “background questionnaire” asked about the school meal plan and cable 
television subscription.  
We measured time preferences by asking participants to make 46 binary choices between 
a certain amount of money received earlier ($3 or $7) and a larger amount received later (either 
between $3.05 and $7, or between $7.10 and $15). Half the choices were between an immediate 
payment and a payment one week later, and half the choices were between a payment one week 
later and a payment two weeks later. 
  Our approach to measuring time preferences is standard (Shane Frederick, George 
Loewenstein, and Ted O’Donoghue 2002). Similar measures predict variation in discounting-
related behaviors such as drug addiction, cigarette smoking, excessive gambling, use of 
commitment savings devices, borrowing on installment accounts and credit cards, and rapid 
exhaustion of food stamps.
5 
We measured risk preferences with 18 binary choices between a sure $4 and an X percent 
chance at $8, where X varied from 25 to 76. Risk aversion measures derived from real-stakes 
experimental choices such as ours are highly correlated with measures from hypothetical 
choices, which in turn predict risky behaviors such as smoking, drinking, failing to hold 
insurance, holding stocks rather than Treasury bills, being self-employed, switching jobs, and 
moving residences.
6 
                                                 
5 See Victor Fuchs (1982), Warren K. Bickel, Amy L. Odum, and Gregory J. Madden (1999), Kris N. Kirby, Nancy 
M. Petry, and Bickel (1999), Petry and Thomas Casarella (1999), Kirby and Petry (2004), Jesse M. Shapiro (2005), 
Nava Ashraf, Dean S. Karlan, and Wesley Yin (2006), and Stephan Meier and Charles Sprenger (forthcoming). 
6 See Robert B. Barsky et al. (1997), Luigi Guiso and Monica Paiella (forthcoming), Thomas Dohmen et al. (2005), 
and Claudia R. Sahm (2007).   8
One of the time or risk preference choices was randomly selected to determine each 
participant’s payout. All payments were made by a check given to the participant immediately 
following the experiment. Delayed payments were implemented by post-dating the check.
7  
  
B. Econometric Methodology 
  In the time preference task, our dependent variable is the log of the minimum 
continuously compounded weekly interest rate that the subject requires to choose the later 
payment. That is, we apply the log operator once to transform the reservation gross interest rate 
into the continuously compounded net interest rate, and then we apply the log operator again. 
The second application of the log operator causes the estimator we describe below to assume that 
reservation continuously compounded interest rates are conditionally log-normal, thus ruling out 
negative discount rates. In the risk preference task, our dependent variable is the minimum risk 
premium—that is, the expected return offered by the gamble in excess of the risk-free return—
that the subject requires to accept the gamble. For example, if the subject would choose to 
gamble for $8 rather than accept the sure $4 if and only if the probability of winning is at least 58 
percent, then the reservation risk premium is (8 × 0.58 – 4)/4 = 0.16.
8 
  Because we observe choices at only a finite number of interest rates and risk premia, we 
use an interval regression (Mark B. Stewart 1983), which is a generalization of the tobit 
estimator that allows the econometrician to specify that the dependent variable value lies 
                                                 
7 If a risk preference choice was selected for payment, the check was immediately cashable. 
8 In this formula, we treat the risk choice as investing a $4 endowment into either the risk-free or risky asset.   9
somewhere within an interval. Due to outliers, we will focus on median interest rates in our 




Table 1 displays, by experimental condition and race, the average proportion of choices 
where subjects chose the earlier or safe option. In the unprimed condition, Asians are somewhat 
more impatient and risk averse than whites. This comparison may be confounded by sample 
selection (both into the Harvard student body and into the experiment); in the nationally 
representative Health and Retirement Study, middle-aged and older Asian-Americans appear to 
be less risk averse than whites on average (Barsky et al. 1997). Even in a representative sample, 
identity effects cannot be inferred from simple differences in measured preferences because 
social category affiliations are confounded with many unobserved factors. To learn about 
identity effects, we instead turn to the comparisons between treatment and control groups. 
Even though Table 1 discards all information about the prices involved in each trade-off, 
the main result of Experiment 1 is apparent: Asians make significantly fewer impatient choices 
when their ethnicity is primed. The 14 percentage point drop in the proportion of impatient 
choices is significant at the 1 percent level. In contrast, whites seem to get slightly more 
impatient in the ethnicity-salience condition, but the difference is not significant. The fact that 
whites do not respond to the prime is evidence that that the Asian priming effect is not driven by 
some channel common to both Asians and whites. Neither whites nor Asians change their risk 
choices in response to the ethnicity prime. 
                                                 
9 In the interest rate regressions that follow, if the coefficients imply that a certain set of explanatory variable values 
is associated with a mean log continuously compounded interest rate of ˆ μ , then the median continuously 
compounded interest rate is ˆ exp( ) μ .   10
Table 2 presents formal regression evidence on priming effects, incorporating price 
information. We regress participants’ reservation log continuously compounded interest rate and 
risk premium on an experimental condition dummy. The interest rate regression also includes 
dummies for whether the intertemporal choice is between payments deferred for one week versus 
two weeks, whether the earlier payout being offered is $7, and the interaction of the above two 
dummies. We cluster standard errors in the interest rate regression by subject (Kenneth A. Froot 
1989; William Rogers 1993). Column 1 confirms that the interest rate required by Asians to 
defer payment falls dramatically when Asian ethnic identity is made salient. For example, for 
trade-offs between $4 now and money one week from now, the median required interest rate falls 
from 8.8 percent to 2.1 percent. Running separate regressions for each intertemporal choice type 
(immediate payment amount × time horizon) reveals that this treatment effect is significant at the 
1 percent level and of similar magnitude for all four types.
10 Column 3 shows that there is no 
effect on the risk premium Asians require to accept gambles, which is perhaps not surprising 
given the previous literature’s ambiguous findings on Asian risk attitudes.
11 Columns 2 and 4 
show, in analogous regressions for white subjects, that whites’ choices are not affected by the 
prime.  
 
                                                 
10 In a regression that includes an interaction between identity salience and an indicator for one’s family having 
lived in the U.S. for fewer than two generations, the interaction is insignificantly negative for Asians. However, this 
regression must be interpreted cautiously because we did not measure immigration status for the control group and 
so cannot include immigration status as an uninteracted regressor. 
11 See Lawrence K. Hong (1978), Barsky et al. (1997), Elke U. Weber and Christopher Hsee (1998), and Hsee and 
Weber (1999).   11
III. Experiment 2: Black Racial Norms and Gender Norms 
A. Procedure 
We recruited 280 Temple University students and 231 University of Michigan students. 
We randomly assigned participants to the race-salience, gender-salience, or control conditions. 
No blacks were assigned to the gender-salience condition due to their scarcity in the sample.  
The first section of the questionnaire contained the category-salience manipulation or 
control questions, modeled after Shih, Pittinsky, and Ambady (1999). In the race-salience 
condition, this section asked subjects to identify their race and opine on living with roommates of 
the same or different race. In the gender-salience condition, subjects identified their gender and 
opined on living on a co-ed versus single-sex dormitory floor. In the control condition, the first 
section asked about living on or off campus. 
The next three sections were a time preference elicitation, a risk preference elicitation, 
and a shortened version of the Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Theresa M. Marteau 
and Hilary Bekker 1992). These three sections’ order varied across sessions. The penultimate 
section was an eight-minute math quiz with six SAT-like questions. We paid participants 10 
cents for each correctly answered math question. The final section asked questions about 
personal and family background. Participants were paid for their choices by check immediately 
upon completing the experiment. 
We measured time preferences by asking participants to make 24 binary choices between 
$10 earlier and some larger amount later, ranging from $10.10 to $15. Half the choices were 
between an immediate payment and a payment one week later, and half the choices were 
between a payment one week later and a payment two weeks later. One question in this section 
was randomly chosen for payment. Delayed payments were implemented via post-dated check.   12
The section’s instructions made it clear that the questions were not intended to evaluate 
performance: “It’s important to keep in mind that there are no right or wrong answers here. 
Which choice you make is a matter of personal preference.” We used this same wording again in 
the instructions for the risk preference elicitations. 
We elicited small-stakes risk preferences by asking participants to make six binary 
choices between $1 for sure and a 50 percent chance at a larger amount, ranging from $1.60 to 
$3.60. All six choices affected each subject’s payment. We measured larger-stakes risk 
preferences with analogous choices, except that the monetary amounts were multiplied by 100 
and there was only a small chance that the subject’s choice would be implemented.
12 
 
B. Main Results 
Table 3 displays, by demographic group × treatment group, the average percent of 
intertemporal or risk choices where subjects chose the earlier or safe payment, respectively.
13 (A 
Web appendix table reports descriptive statistics for each demographic × treatment group.) We 
classify blacks as immigrants if they responded in the debriefing survey that either they or at 
least one of their parents were born outside the U.S. Because no blacks were assigned to the 
gender-salience condition, we exclude all blacks from the control group when making 
comparisons to a gender-salience treatment group. 
As in Experiment 1, our student subjects are a highly selected population, and this is 
reflected in their baseline choices. For instance, blacks are on average more risk averse than 
whites in nationally representative data (on middle-aged and older Americans; see Sahm 2007), 
                                                 
12 Any money participants earned from their risk choices was paid with a check that could be cashed immediately. 
13 To be clear that they are not driving our results, we have dropped the four native blacks who were over 22 years 
old, all of whom were randomized into the race-salience treatment. These subjects—ages 23, 23, 34, and 47—
differed from other subjects along many dimensions. Our priming results are qualitatively similar if we include these 
four subjects.   13
whereas our unprimed native black subjects choose the safe payment less often than our white 
subjects. We identify identity effects by comparing unprimed participants with primed 
participants within each demographic group. 
Table 3 shows that when we discard all price information, we do not find any treatment 
effects that reach statistical significance. Table 4 presents regression evidence incorporating 
price information. Our econometric methodology is similar to that used for Experiment 1. The 
dependent variable is either the log of the continuously compounded reservation interest rate or 
the reservation risk premium. The explanatory variables are a dummy for whether a social 
category is being made salient, a tradeoff type dummy (whether the intertemporal choice is 
between payments deferred for one week versus two weeks, or whether the sure payout in the 
risky choice is $100), a dummy for whether the subjects were recruited at Michigan, and an 
interaction between the tradeoff type and Michigan dummies. 
In Panel A, we see that making race salient to native blacks significantly lowers their 
reservation interest rate for deferring receipt of payment.
14 For example, fitted regression 
estimates from the table indicate that when choosing between money now and money one week 
from now, the median continuously compounded reservation interest rate among Temple 
students falls from 23.2 percent to 10.9 percent. In contrast, race salience has no effect on white 
and immigrant black reservation interest rates.
15 It appears that racial identity effects on discount 
                                                 
14 The difference in the statistical significance of the native black priming effect in Table 3 versus Table 4 is mainly 
due to the fact that the reservation continuously compounded interest rate is close to log-normally distributed. 
Therefore, using the log of the continuously compounded interest rate as the dependent variable in a regression 
results in an efficient estimate of the median. The comparison of percentages in Table 3 did not utilize such a 
transformation, resulting in an inefficient estimate. Note that we had subjects make many more intertemporal 
choices in Experiment 1 than in Experiment 2, so the inefficient estimator used in Table 1 still has sufficient power 
to detect the Asian priming effect. 
15 The difference between the native black coefficient and the white coefficient is significant at the 10 percent level 
(p = 0.06), as is the difference between the native black and immigrant black coefficients (p = 0.10). However, these 
comparisons must be interpreted carefully, since the dependent variable has been transformed by two applications of 
the log function. A one unit movement in the transformed interest rate does not translate to an equivalent size   14
rates do not cause the capital accumulation gap between blacks and whites, and between native 
and immigrant blacks. 
The last two columns of Table 4’s Panel A show that making gender salient has no 
significant effects on either men’s or women’s patience. Panel B shows that there are no 
significant priming effects on any of the groups’ risk aversions either. In particular, there is no 
indication that male identity contains a stronger risk-seeking norm than female identity. 
Subjects who did not believe that our preference elicitations were incentive-compatible 
may have made low-quality decisions or acted strategically (rather than reporting their true 
preferences), adding noise and bias to our treatment effect estimates. Therefore, an interesting 
subsample is the set of subjects who reported in the debriefing questionnaire that they believed 
that they would be paid exactly as promised in the experimental instructions.
16  
Our first question regarding payment credibility asked, “Throughout this experiment, you 
made choices that involved various amounts of money. We said that your responses would affect 
how much you get paid, but you may not have believed us. Did you believe that your responses 
would affect how much you get paid?” The second question asked, “Think back to when you 
were answering questions about getting a certain amount of money today versus getting some 
different amount of money in a week. Did you believe that you would actually get paid in a week 
if you chose to take the money in a week?” 
                                                                                                                                                             
movement in the untransformed interest rate, which is the price that is relevant to subjects. To get a sense of the 
magnitudes in the untransformed scale, we perform a calculation similar to the one in the main text and find that 
primed Temple whites’ median reservation interest rate falls by only 0.4 percentage points, and primed Temple 
immigrant blacks’ median reservation interest rate falls by only 0.7 percentage points. Analogous calculations for 
Michigan subjects yield similar results. 
16 We did not measure our credibility among Experiment 1 subjects. Experiment 1 was conducted on Harvard 
undergraduates by the third author, who was also a Harvard undergraduate at the time. We had no affiliation with 
Temple, and only a temporary non-faculty affiliation with the University of Michigan. In subsequent experiments 
similar to Experiment 2 (but with a different priming manipulation) at one of our home institutions, we find belief 
rates around 80 percent, suggesting that credibility is in fact much higher when social distance is smaller.   15
In a Web appendix table, we show that the category salience manipulations had no 
statistically significant effect on belief in our payment promises, but between 35 and 53 percent 
of subjects within each demographic group × experimental condition cell reported some 
disbelief. Other studies have shown that without financial incentives, experimental participants 
behave more randomly and exert less effort (see Colin F. Camerer and Robin M. Hogarth 1999 
for a literature review). We have suggestive evidence that this is true among our skeptics. One 
measure of participants’ cognitive effort is whether their choices are “well-behaved”—choosing 
the delayed payment if and only if the interest rate exceeds exactly one threshold, and choosing 
the gamble if and only if the risk premium exceeds exactly one threshold.
17 Respectively, 7 
percent and 21 percent of participants who did not believe our payment promises failed to 
answer the intertemporal and risk questions in a well-behaved manner. These proportions are 
greater than the 5 percent and 16 percent of believers who made poorly behaved intertemporal or 
risk choices, but it should be noted that these differences are not statistically significant.
18 
Because dropping self-reported skeptics causes us to discard so much data, subjects 
endogenously chose their response to the belief questions, and merely asking questions about 
payment credibility may have generated skepticism ex post even if none was present during the 
preference elicitations, the subsample results that follow should be interpreted with caution. 
In Table 5, we exclude subjects who did not believe that their choices would affect their 
payment. For our time preference regressions, we additionally drop subjects who did not believe 
they would receive deferred payments. We find that restricting our sample to self-reported 
                                                 
17 Our results are qualitatively similar when excluding subjects whose choices were poorly behaved. 
18 Non-believers also made a higher fraction of impatient choices (p = 0.02) and cautious choices (not statistically 
significant), which is consistent with their exerting less cognitive effort (Daniel J. Benjamin, Sebastian A. Brown, 
and Jesse M. Shapiro 2006). Charles A. Holt and Susan K. Laury (2002) find that subjects become less risk averse 
when they are not offered incentives. Our results may not be inconsistent with Holt and Laury’s because they 
explicitly told their subjects that the choices were hypothetical, whereas our non-believing subjects apparently 
believed we were deceiving them about incentives.   16
believers qualitatively changes some of our results. Although the point estimate for the effect of 
priming race on time preference is nearly identical in the full native black sample and in the 
restricted native black sample (which is 41 percent smaller), the effect loses statistical 
significance in the restricted sample. Priming race also causes white discount rates to drop 
significantly among believers, suggesting that there may be a patient white racial norm as well.
19 
In the risk domain for the restricted sample, we find that priming racial identity raises the 
reservation native black risk premium among believers by 23 percentage points, a change that is 
significant at the 1 percent level. In contrast, immigrant blacks’ required risk premium falls by 
11 percentage points when race is salient, although the drop is not statistically different from 
zero. The native black priming effect on risk aversion is statistically different from the white and 
immigrant black priming effects (both p-values < 0.01). This result is consistent with the 
hypothesis that racial risk norms depress native blacks’ stock market participation. 
  
C. Potential Alternative Explanations 
Stereotype threat, lift, and emotional states. Many researchers have documented the “stereotype 
threat” phenomenon: making race or gender salient impairs the cognitive performance of groups 
with stereotypically poor performance. Conversely, making negative stereotypes about other 
groups salient improves cognitive performance, a finding dubbed “stereotype lift.”
20 It is 
believed that stereotype threat and lift effects operate through increasing or reducing anxiety that 
                                                 
19 Race (e.g. white) is distinct from ethnicity (e.g. German). The priming effect on whites in Experiment 2 should be 
interpreted as a race salience effect on whites. For whites in Experiment 1, the priming effect should be interpreted 
as an ethnicity salience effect for the various ethnicities relevant to the white subjects. 
20 Studies documenting stereotype threat and lift include Claude M. Steele and Joshua Aronson (1995), Shih, 
Pittinsky, and Ambady (1999), Gregory M. Walton and Geoffrey L. Cohen (2003), David M. Marx and Diederik A. 
Stapel (2006), and Thomas S. Dee (2008).   17
one will confirm negative stereotypes about one’s group. Consistent with this mechanism, these 
effects vanish when tasks are presented to subjects as not being diagnostic of ability. 
A possible explanation for our results is that the category primes affected subjects’ ability 
to compute expected values and interest rates. We think this explanation is unlikely because we 
did not present the preference elicitation questions as being diagnostic of ability. In Experiment 
2, we explicitly told subjects that there are no right or wrong answers for the preference 
elicitation questions.  
However, even if stereotype threat and lift effects on cognitive ability were not present, it 
is possible that the priming questions induced changes in subjects’ emotional states which 
affected their expressed preferences. For example, if certain priming questions agitated subjects, 
their willingness to delay payment receipt or take risks may change (Loewenstein 2000). 
To check that our results are not being driven by stereotype threat, stereotype lift, or 
emotional changes, we examine how the primes affected performance on the five math quiz 
questions administered after the elicitations and responses to the anxiety inventory. The primes 
had no effect on math quiz performance or anxiety (results not shown in tables).
21 
  
                                                 
21 Stereotype threat and lift effects have been shown to last at least 16 minutes after race is made salient (Jim 
Blascovich et al. 2001). Hence, these effects (if we had activated them) would be expected to affect performance in 
our math quiz, which was administered approximately 12 minutes after the prime. We can confirm that our priming 
effect on time preference persists for at least 12 minutes because we varied the order of the preference elicitations 
(in Experiment 2). In fact, the priming effect is largest immediately before the math quiz, although this is mainly 
driven by control subjects becoming more impatient, rather than primed subjects becoming more patient. We thank a 
referee for pointing out that, even if stereotype threat did not affect the preference elicitations, one might have 
expected stereotype threat to be activated for the math questions, since they are clearly diagnostic of ability. The 
lack of such an effect here may be due to the many non-diagnostic tasks performed between the prime and the math 
quiz. Stereotype threat studies typically administer the diagnostic task immediately after the identity-relevant 
questions and present the task as the focus of the researchers’ interest, making it more likely that subjects will infer 
that their performance on that task will be used to judge their race or gender.   18
Experimenter “demand effects.” If participants understood the purpose of the experiment, then 
our priming effects could be explained by a “demand effect” that caused participants to behave 
in the way they thought the experimenters wanted them to behave. 
In the Michigan sample, we asked in the final questionnaire section, “Think back to when 
you were making choices about money. While you were making those choices, were you 
thinking about what we wanted you to do?” Ninety percent of subjects circled the answer, “No, I 
was making the choice I wanted to make. I was not thinking about what the experimenter might 
want me to choose.” Of those who instead circled yes, most made innocuous guesses about what 
the experimenters wanted (like “to see whether or not we were risk takers with money”), and no 
one made a guess related to race or gender. Our results are qualitatively similar when we drop 
subjects who reported thinking about what the experimenter wanted them to do. 
 
Type I error. Although our main priming effects are highly statistically significant, we also tested 
many hypotheses. One way to gain a sense for the likelihood that our results are driven by Type I 
error is to see if the priming effects are consistent at both schools in which we collected data. 
Running regressions separately for each school, we find that the native black discount rate effect 
is strong among the Michigan subjects, where the identity salience coefficient is –1.628 and the 
p-value is 0.006. The effect is also negative among the native black subjects at Temple, although 
the identity salience coefficient is smaller (–0.281) and the p-value is larger (0.353). 
In the subsample of subjects who reported believing our payment promises, priming race 
in native blacks caused them to become more risk averse in both the Temple sample (coefficient 
= 0.153, p = 0.094) and the Michigan sample (coefficient = 0.358, p = 0.013). The point estimate 
for the race priming effect on immigrant blacks’ reservation risk premium is negative at both   19
Temple (–0.125) and Michigan (–0.035), and the p-value for the difference between the native 
and immigrant black race priming effects on the risk premium is 0.045 at Temple and 0.059 at 
Michigan. The white believer subsample’s discount rate priming effect is negative at both 
schools, but stronger at Temple (coefficient = –0.967, p = 0.029) than at Michigan (coefficient = 
–0.418, p = 0.368). 
 
IV. Conclusion 
  Our results suggest that social identity affects fundamental economic preferences. We 
find that making Asian-American subjects’ ethnicity salient causes them to exhibit more patient 
preferences. Making race salient to black subjects decreases discount rates among those who 
have longstanding roots in the U.S. There is also suggestive evidence that native blacks become 
more risk averse and whites more patient when their racial identity is salient. 
  Understanding identity salience effects is important for at least two reasons. First, as we 
have emphasized in this paper, identity salience manipulations are an empirical tool that 
economists can use to test theories about how steady-state identity affiliations matter for 
behavior. Second, identity primes may in themselves have important real-world behavioral 
consequences. If being the only female in line at the polling booth primes the gender identity 
category, then it may influence the woman to vote for a female candidate.
22 An American-born 
black worker who is enrolling in his 401(k) may, due to a transitory racial prime, choose a higher 
savings rate. Even though his discount rate was only temporarily depressed, a large body of 
empirical evidence has shown that most households’ retirement savings decisions are highly 
inertial (William Samuelson and Richard Zeckhauser 1988; Brigitte C. Madrian and Dennis F. 
                                                 
22 Jonah Berger, Marc Meredith, and S. Christian Wheeler (2008) find that voters who vote in a school are more 
likely to vote to raise taxes to support education.   20
Shea 2001; James J. Choi et al. 2002), so the momentary effect of the prime could have long-run 
consequences. Priming effects raise the possibility that a benevolent policymaker could 
intentionally use identity primes as an instrument for encouraging desirable behaviors in various 
domains, such as savings and investing. Of course, policymakers and other market players will 
have self-interested motives as well for manipulating the primes to which individuals are 
exposed.   21
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  Percent impatient choices  Percent safe choices 
  Asians  Whites  Asians  Whites 
Control 26.37  20.90  66.67  57.96 
  (17.49) (17.94) (21.54)  (25.00) 
Ethnicity Salient  12.63  27.14  64.41  57.28 
 (16.28)  (17.78)  (25.07)  (16.34) 
p-value of difference  0.0010  0.1639  0.6872  0.8998 
Ν  71 66 71  66 
Notes: This table shows the percent of intertemporal choices in which subjects chose the earlier payment, and the 
percent of risk choices in which subjects declined the gamble. The percentages are reported separately for Asians 
and whites by experimental condition. Cross-subject standard deviations of the percentages are in parentheses. The 
penultimate row shows p-values of the t-test for equality of means in those percentages between the ethnicity-
salience and control conditions. The final row shows the number of subjects in each demographic group. 
 
TABLE 2—ETHNICITY-SALIENCE TREATMENT EFFECT ON 
ASIAN AND WHITE LOG INTEREST RATE AND RISK PREMIUM, EXPERIMENT 1 
  Log interest rate  Risk premium 
  Asians  Whites  Asians  Whites 


















Larger Stakes × 






















Ν  284 264  71 66 
Notes: This table presents interval regressions where the latent dependent variable is the log continuously 
compounded interest rate required to defer payment receipt or the risk premium required to accept a gamble. We 
pool each subject’s four intertemporal choices. Ethnicity Salient is a dummy for the subject receiving the ethnicity-
salience treatment. 1 Week vs. 2 Weeks is a dummy for if the intertemporal choice was between payments deferred 
for one week versus two weeks. Larger Stakes is a dummy for if the earlier payout in the intertemporal choice was 
$7. The estimated conditional standard deviation of the latent dependent variable is denoted by  ˆ. σ  The final row 
reports the number of choices in the regressions. Standard errors appear in parentheses below the point estimates. 
Huber-White standard errors, clustered by subject, are reported for the log interest rate regressions. * Significant at 
the 5 percent level. ** Significant at the 1 percent level TABLE 3—PERCENT OF IMPATIENT OR SAFE CHOICES, EXPERIMENT 2 






blacks  Men  Women 
Control 41.54  63.58  52.30  46.54  36.06 
  (31.04) (23.07) (25.07)  (31.64)  (28.39) 
Social category salient  40.10  50.53  48.94  49.20  40.32 
  (32.03) (32.30) (26.62)  (30.13)  (28.33) 
p-value of difference  0.6967  0.1390  0.6591  0.7293  0.4594 
N  222 71  53  129  134 
Panel B: Percent of choices that were safe 




blacks  Men  Women 
Control 51.42  48.46  50.60  49.19  49.80 
  (21.43) (18.20) (19.37)  (20.94)  (21.41) 
Social category salient  47.13  55.87  48.33  45.74  44.88 
 (20.98)  (18.47)  (22.18)  (22.85)  (19.36) 
p-value of difference  0.1226  0.1757  0.7585  0.2823  0.1207 
N  222 71  53  129  134 
Notes: This table shows the percent of intertemporal choices in which subjects chose the earlier payment, and the 
percent of risk choices in which subjects declined the gamble. The percentages are reported separately for each 
demographic group by experimental condition. “Social category salient” refers to the race-salience treatment (first 
three columns) or the gender-salience treatment (last two columns). Cross-subject standard deviations of the 
percentages are in parentheses. In order to test for differences between the control and social category salient 
percentages, we run an OLS regression of each variable of interest on a treatment dummy, a dummy for whether the 
subject was recruited at Michigan (because the proportion of Michigan students is not equal across treatment cells), 
and a constant. The p-values reported in the penultimate row of each panel are for the treatment dummy coefficients. 
The final row in each panel shows the number of subjects. 
 TABLE 4—CATEGORY-SALIENCE TREATMENT EFFECTS, EXPERIMENT 2 






blacks  Men  Women 
Social Category   -0.0563 -0.7587** -0.0899  -0.1376  0.3213 
Salient  (0.2400) (0.2896) (0.2868) (0.2942) (0.2834) 
1 Week vs. 2 Weeks  -0.1905 -0.1431 0.2863 -0.3897* 0.1501 
  (0.1190) (0.2305) (0.2473) (0.1695) (0.1648) 
UMich  -0.2307 -0.5858 -0.0234  -0.9167**  0.0981 
  (0.2407) (0.3684) (0.4541) (0.2976) (0.2903) 
1 Week vs. 2 Weeks ×  0.0275 0.3317 0.6190 0.3867 -0.4079 
UMich  (0.1628) (0.3061) (0.3450) (0.2039) (0.2178) 
Constant  -2.6663** -1.4605** -2.4737** -1.9818** -3.1398** 
  (0.1984) (0.2147) (0.2575) (0.2147) (0.2688) 
ˆ σ   1.7980 1.4328 1.2002 1.6166 1.6726 
  (0.1012) (0.1517) (0.1176) (0.1252) (0.1154) 
N  444 142 106 258 268 






blacks  Men  Women 
Social Category   -0.0698 0.0986 0.0474  -0.0528  -0.1091 
Salient  (0.0468) (0.0885) (0.0940)  (0.0660)  (0.0598) 
Larger Stakes  0.3176** 0.0470  0.0634  0.3211**  0.1301* 
  (0.0436) (0.0837) (0.0751)  (0.0582)  (0.0572) 
UMich  0.0125 -0.0091 0.1827  -0.0093  -0.1119* 
  (0.0456) (0.1166) (0.1138)  (0.0625)  (0.0568) 
Larger Stakes ×  -0.0724 0.2454 0.1215  -0.0842  0.0812 
UMich  (0.0596) (0.1371) (0.1774)  (0.0852)  (0.0819) 
Constant 0.2002**  0.1732*  0.0976  0.1891**  0.2808** 
  (0.0394) (0.0822) (0.0767)  (0.0491)  (0.0532) 
ˆ σ   0.3954 0.4341 0.4053  0.4087  0.3954 
  (0.0184) (0.0387) (0.0460)  (0.0246)  (0.0236) 
N  444 142 106 258 268 
Notes: This table presents interval regressions where the latent dependent variable is the log continuously 
compounded interest rate required to defer payment receipt or the risk premium required to accept a gamble. We 
pool each subject’s two intertemporal choices together and each subject’s two risk choices together. Social Category 
Salient is a dummy for the race-salience treatment (first three columns) or the gender-salience treatment (last two 
columns). 1 Week vs. 2 Weeks is a dummy for if the intertemporal choice was between payments deferred for one 
week versus two weeks. Larger Stakes is a dummy for if the sure payout in the risky choice was $100. UMich is a 
dummy for whether the subject was recruited at the University of Michigan. The estimated conditional standard 
deviation of the latent dependent variable is denoted by  ˆ. σ  Huber-White standard errors, clustered by subject, are 
reported in parentheses below the point estimates. The final row of each panel reports the number of choices in the 
regressions. * Significant at the 5 percent level. ** Significant at the 1 percent level. TABLE 5—CATEGORY-SALIENCE TREATMENT EFFECTS EXCLUDING  
SUBJECTS SKEPTICAL ABOUT PAYMENTS, EXPERIMENT 2 






blacks  Men  Women 
Social Category   -0.7006*  -0.6919 -0.3800 -0.4524 -0.0925 
Salient  (0.3184) (0.4074) (0.3454) (0.3960) (0.3967) 
1 Week vs. 2 Weeks  -0.1964 -0.0943 0.0968 -0.4452 0.1797 
  (0.1468) (0.2228) (0.3586) (0.2289) (0.2271) 
UMich  -0.3345 -0.1665 -0.3111 -0.6460 -0.0089 
  (0.3012) (0.5126) (0.5760) (0.3728) (0.3928) 
1 Week vs. 2 Weeks ×  0.0348 0.0519 0.9917 0.3709 -0.4447 
UMich  (0.2163) (0.2954) (0.5141) (0.2735) (0.2943) 
Constant  -2.3958** -1.6564** -2.4392** -1.8242** -3.0606** 
  (0.2317) (0.2967) (0.3570) (0.2663) (0.3521) 
ˆ σ   1.7736 1.4725 1.0918 1.4852 1.7317 
  (0.1291) (0.2079) (0.1386) (0.1626) (0.1554) 
N  272 84  56 152  160 






blacks  Men  Women 
Social Category   -0.0583  0.2298**  -0.1062 -0.0888 -0.1133 
Salient  (0.0507) (0.0778) (0.0887) (0.0725) (0.0674) 
Larger Stakes  0.3098** 0.0442  0.1088 0.3027** 0.0938 
  (0.0488) (0.0920) (0.0741) (0.0658) (0.0660) 
UMich  -0.0083 0.0332 0.1101 -0.0522  -0.1616* 
  (0.0493) (0.1171) (0.0868) (0.0684) (0.0628) 
Larger Stakes ×  -0.0308 0.2042 0.0915 -0.0383 0.1596 
UMich  (0.0673) (0.1480) (0.2166) (0.0972) (0.0929) 
Constant 0.2091**  0.0474  0.0919  0.2171**  0.3025** 
  (0.0413) (0.0818) (0.0832) (0.0511) (0.0554) 
ˆ σ   0.3986 0.4087 0.3513 0.4047 0.3961 
  (0.0196) (0.0391) (0.0525) (0.0272) (0.0256) 
N  374 118  80  208 214 
Notes: This table presents interval regressions where the latent dependent variable is the log continuously compounded interest 
rate required to defer payment receipt or the risk premium required to accept a gamble. We pool each subject’s two intertemporal 
choices together and each subject’s two risk choices together. Social Category Salient is a dummy for the race-salience treatment 
(first three columns) or the gender-salience treatment (last two columns). 1 Week vs. 2 Weeks is a dummy for if the intertemporal 
choice was between payments deferred for one week versus two weeks. Larger Stakes is a dummy for if the sure payout in the 
risky choice was $100. UMich is a dummy for whether the subject was recruited at the University of Michigan. The estimated 
conditional standard deviation of the latent dependent variable is denoted by  ˆ. σ  Huber-White standard errors, clustered by 
subject, are reported in parentheses below the point estimates. The final row of each panel reports the number of choices in the 
regressions. * Significant at the 5 percent level. ** Significant at the 1 percent level.  